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Trends in U.S. Air Force Tactical Fighter Life Cycles
I. INTRODUCTION
After reviewing the report of the Defense Science Board's 1977 Summer
Study on the Acquisition Cycle, Deputy Secretary of Defense Duncan asked for 
suggestions and recommendations as to how to improve the acquisition process 
by reducing the length and cost of the cycle.Since that request and its 
responses, concern has become more widespread. Many agree with the Defense 
Science Board's conclusions: i.e., weapons systems are more costly, take 
longer to become operational, and are produced under less than optimum 
circumstances. The inference is that things are getting worse. Remember 
the good-old-days, pre-McNamara of course, when development times were 
short, production rates were high and weapons systems were cheap. The good- 
old-days when the program manager and the contractor could work together 
without being encumbered with magic management schemes and reviews and could 
get the job done. But wait a minute: you've no doubt heard of fly-before-
2 
buy programs, but have you ever heard of the Craig-Cook production plan?
It was "fly-before-buy" circa 1951, and it called for limited production at 
first, in conjunction with early flight testing and correction of deficiencies, 
followed by accelerated production. So, before generalizing about the good- 
old-days of acquisition programs, it's good to examine the historical record 
in some detail to determine where you are, relative to those "good-old-days."
Scope. It is intended here to do just that; to make some generalizations 
about where we are relative to where we were. The study is limited to United 
States Air Force jet fighter development programs, a set of systems for which 
comparable program data have been compiled. Although it is hard to purify 
these program data entirely of external influences such as foreign military 
sales, other tactical applications, and world events, the intent here is to 
examine only those aircraft types which were purchased for and operated by 
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the United States Air Force. As such, this study covers 19 tactical jet 
aircraft types which have been in active Air Force inventory from 1945 
to 1979.
From those 19 types, starting with the first really operational jet, 
the F-80, to the latest, the F-16, the lengths and trends in development 
cycles, the lengths and rates of production and deployment cycles, and 
the cost trends will be examined. There has been considerable discussion 
of these areas, but that discussion has been based on generalized aggregate 
data.
For instance, Dr. Perry, US DR&E, said in his statement to Congress 
on the FY 80 Program for Research, Development and Acquisition that there 
has been an average increase of nine percent per year in the cost of fighter
3 
aircraft systems. This is an accurate generalized statement, but it obscures 
the fact that there is a significant difference in the cost growth of the 
different mission areas of air superiority, close air support, and all weather 
interdiction. There is also a significant difference in the cost growth 
trends of the highs and the lows of the so called high-low mix. And there 
may be a difference in the cost growth of Navy and Air Force types of aircraft.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is also
4 
concerned about the increased acquisition time of weapons systems. Here 
the concern is that it is taking longer to get to the initial operational 
capability (IOC) of equipment, with the result that such equipment may embody 
outdated technology when it is fielded. Perry's report argues that there 
has been little change in the time from the beginning of full scale develop-
5 ....ment to first flight, but that there has been a significant increase in 
the time to get to full production and deployment. (See Figures 1 and 2)
Here again, all systems, types, and models are lumped together when, in
-3-
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fact, there are significant differences in the full scale development 
time for systems, with such time depending upon the lead-in work done on 
the systems in preparation for full scale development. This is not in­
tended as a new relevation, but more as a reminder that the designation 
of the beginning of full scale development may vary widely and does not 
necessarily indicate equal development maturity among the programs.
With fewer aircraft types going into the inventory and fewer numbers 
of each type procured, plus the fact that no new developments are imminent, 
the lives of our current aircraft may have to be longer and they may have 
to be adapted to new roles. Is the policy of "advancement of existing
£ 
airframes" a new phenomenon? Hardly. In this study there are some inter­
esting cases discussed, and there are indications that, historically, air­
frame adaptions are short lived.
Someone already probably has caught the "19 types" and said to himself 
that there are only 17 types: thus the first of many problems of definition. 
The division here is into 19 types and includes the F-84F and the F-86D as 
separate types. These two types are considered sufficiently different from 
the basic airframes to be treated as completely separate programs. At one 
time the Air Force did too, in that it called the F-84F the F-96A and the 
F-86D the F-95A. Of course the question then is: why wasn't the F-94C 
separated, since it was originally the F-97A? In this case the F-94C was 
the only really successful version of the F-94, life of the type was rela­
tively short, and breaking it out separately would not have had a significant 
effect on the trends.
At this point a word should be said about the limitations of this study. 
It is not intended that the results have precise numbers and data. Such 
a study would be a large volume of a variety of cases, assumptions, and 
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conclusions. The data herein are not carried to the seventh significant 
digit. Least squared regression analysis gave way to the eyeball with the 
notion that the rigor of least squares would not tell anything additional 
other than to refine the magnitude of the trend. Such refinement and pre­
cision could easily be overwhelmed by the assumptions and circumstances 
surrounding any specific case. Thus, this study suffers from generalization,
7 
the same as the Defense Science Board's Summer Study, but the generalizations 
are at a significantly lower level.
Q
Historical Notes. Figure 3 summarizes the life cycles of the 19 planes 
in our study. There are several events to be kept in mind when reviewing 
these programs in order to put the programs and the decisions concerning 
these programs in context. For example, the F-80 was developed during World 
War II with the attendant wartime procurement practices, while the context 
of the F-16's development program is completely different. The detonation 
of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in the late forties caused a spurt in 
weapons development, including such aircraft programs as the F-89 and the 
F-94. Of course Korea and Vietnam affected quantity and quality decisions 
for follow-on types like the F-100 and the A-10. Technology certainly 
played its part, with the discovery of the area rule (the "coke-bottle" 
shape) making supersonic flight practical. Until its discovery, the old 
F-86's outperformed the original "straight" F-102's. Finally, tactical 
considerations have affected developments; for example in the demise of 
long range bomber escorts like the F-84 and F-101 and the new dedication 
to close air support with the A-7 and A-10.
There are some interesting geneologies in these programs. The Air 
Force A-7D started as a Navy A-7 which was derived from the Navy F-8.
Such derivation was directed by Secretary McNamara as a means of cutting
-6-
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development costs and time. The old F-94 was derived from the T-33 which 
was derived from the F-80. By the time this evolution was through, a 
day fighter had become a "supersonic" all-weather interceptor, armed with 
rockets and with an afterburning engine. Though there is a traceable 
geneology, the actual interchangability of parts had dimished to something 
like altimeters, landing gear doors and tail surfaces. Tooling for the 
F-84F was to be 55% common with the previous F-84's, even though it intro­
duced a swept wing to the F-84 series. It turned out to have hardly any­
thing in common with the straight-wing 84's.
The active lives of the types has varied considerably. The F-84F was 
overtaken by technology and was phased out of active service only 11 months 
after the last aircraft was accepted by the Air Force. At the other extreme 
is the F-106 which is still in service 19 years after the last delivery.
The requirements process has some interesting events also. The orig­
inal TFX requirement stipulated vertical take off. Be thankful we didn't 
have to pay for that, too. Then, there is the case of the F-106 where the 
requirement really was not made final until 3 months before first flight, 
a sure way to have the requirements and performance nearly match. (There 
is one better — wait until after first flight.)
One final note, the A-10 could be said to have nearly had both the 
longest and the shortest development program; it depends on how you count 
the prototype program in full scale development. If the prototype program 
is excluded, the A-10 has had the shortest full scale development since 
the F-84 series. If the prototype program is included, the A-10 program 
has had the longest development program except for the F-4 and F-16. Each 
case should be examined in the proper context.
-8-
The history of these fighter programs is filled with what appears to 
be inconsistencies and poor decisions. However, taken in the context of 
the events and circumstances surrounding such programs, such inconsis­
tencies and decisions often are understandable, even if you do not agree 
with the judgment.
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II. DEVELOPMENT CYCLES
In his overview statement to Congress on the FY 80 Program for Research, 
Development and Acquisition, Dr. Perry said there are indications that the 
average acquisition time for several different kinds of weapons programs has 
increased from 4% years in the 1960's to over 7 years in the 1970's.^ The 
time from the start of full scale development to the start of production 
and the IOC is growing for most aircraft programs while, at the same time, 
the time from the start of full scale development to first flight has not 
changed appreciably. The conclusion is that the lengthening times to deploy­
ment is due to increased testing and the strict sequencing of development, 
testing and production rather than overlapping these activities.
Defining the time it takes to develop a system is subject to debate. 
First, when did development start? By convention, it starts on the date 
of the full scale development contract, and this is about the only date 
which has a common meaning. However, not all development programs are at 
the same stage when the contract is awarded, and this is one cause of the 
wide variance in the time to first flight.
Many activities go on before the award of the full scale development 
contract. Obviously the proposal preparation contributes to the development. 
There are studies and analyses. There are technologies developed under 
other programs which are incorporated. These and other activities contribute 
to the development process and may or may not be included in the full scale 
development time. The one thing common with the award of a full scale develop­
ment contract, no matter what the stage of the development thus far, is 
the decision to produce a fully operating model and to test its operational 
capabilities. It is a point of standard commitment, and is used in this 
study as the beginning of full scale development.
-10-
The next question is when to end the development. A common date to 
use is the initial operational capability (IOC) date. From the standpoint 
of the service it is an excellent measure, the time when the first unit of 
men and machines are combat ready. From a purely hardware-development 
standpoint, the delivery of the first production aircraft to an operational 
unit is a key milestone and a better measure. By using the first delivery 
date, factors such as production rate, arbitrary definition of IOC, and 
training time are eliminated. It is further granted that there is overlap 
of the end of full scale development and the beginning of production, and 
the amount of concurrency varies from program to program. But any milestone 
used is subject to definition and debate; therefore, for the purpose of 
this study, full scale development is defined as being the period of time 
from contract award to first production delivery.
There seems to be a logical division amongst the 19 types. It is not, 
as you might suspect, based on time or technology. At least you cannot make 
that generalization across-the-board. Instead, the three divisions are: 
variants of previous production systems, variants of previous experimental 
systems, and new starts. Though breaking the small number of programs into 
three creates even smaller subsamples and may not be in keeping with rigor­
ous analysis, it does reveal some interesting trends.
First, the variants of previous production systems (Figure 4) seem 
to have a fairly level trend in the amount of time it takes for development. 
This sample, you will note, even includes the F-106 and counts the time-to- 
develop a F-106 as we know the F-106 to be today. It seems to matter little 
whether it was a relatively simple change from the production version such 
as the F-4B to F-4C or a relatively complex change such as changing the 
engine and avionics suite of the A-7; it takes on the average two years, 
give or take a couple of months, for full scale development.
-11-
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The second subgroup, variants of previous experimental aircraft
(Figure 5), also shows a trend. Here there may be some question about 
using only the full scale development time, excluding the prototype phase 
of the A-10 and F-16 in the sample. Realistically, these prototype programs 
do equate to such aircraft as the XF-88 and the XF-92, predecessors of the
F-101 and F-102 programs respectively. The prototypes of the A-10 and F-16, 
though closely resembling the final configuration aerodynamically, were 
austere and required a considerable further development effort, as can be 
seen by the amount of time required. 
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Once the decision was made to begin full scale development there was a 
rather large development effort. The conclusion is that there is a favor­
able trend in development time for variants of previous experimental air­
craft programs, and this is largely due to the F-16/A-10 experience.
What remains is new-start programs (Figure 6), and the findings 
associated with these types of programs. Here the A-10 and F-16 total 
development times, including the prototype phase, are included. Although 
these two programs may affect the magnitude of the outcome, they do little 
to influence the trend. The trend here is unmistakably to longer develop­
ment times. Some of this time may be because of measures instituted to 
reduce risk and better prepare for production and some may be simply 
different bookkeeping.
A case could be made that the length of the present day development 
programs equate to the "real" development times of earlier aircraft. The
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earlier programs were all plagued with extensive modification and retrofits 
after the aircraft had entered the inventory. As a matter of fact it was 
usually the B, C and D models of the system which had the largest production 
quantity and longest service life. This suggests, and in fact was the case 
in one instance, that the A's were still development aircraft. Thus, if the 
development times of earlier programs were in fact longer than indicated, 
the development times for new starts probably have grown, but not by as much 
as is commonly believed.
Thus, if all the operational types are considered, a case can be made 
that there has been little or no growth in the average development times of 
aircraft. The manner in which one treats the development time of the A-10 
and F-16 influences the outcome somewhat. With the current policy, as stated 
by the services, of modification of existing airframes, one can estimate that 
the "new" developments in the near future will take on the order of two years. 
Development programs to replace the present generation of aircraft will take 
on the order of 66 months, prototype or not, if there is no urgency or tech­
nological breakthrough. If there is a technological breakthrough, based on 
the enhanced tactical fighter studies which are currently ongoing, and an 
experimental aircraft is used to lead a new development, then it should be 
estimated that such development time would take approximately 48 months.
Thus the urgency of the program and the technological advancement required 
may be traded off to govern the length of the development time for the next 
generation tactical fighter aircraft.
-14-
III. PRODUCTION CYCLES
Program offices put a good deal of effort into designing optimum pro­
duction facilities, with rates, quantities, and types influencing the 
process. Facilities are designed to produce at a certain rate, but external 
factors, like Congress, frequently take over and ignore all the preparation. 
Since the final production rate, quantity, and type are seldom as originally 
envisioned, it's good to look at the historical trends of the average 
rate of USAF tactical fighter production to determine if we are in fact now 
producing at a slower rate and thus less efficient. The common notion is 
that USAF airplanes used to come off the line like automobiles.
In this study production is defined as beginning with the delivery of 
the first operational aircraft and ending with the delivery of the last 
operational aircraft. In order to determine the average rate, the number 
of aircraft delivered to the USAF is divided by the number of months from 
first delivery to last delivery. The production people may take issue with 
this method, which ignores rate buildup and wind-down times. However, what 
is of interest here is not production capacities and delivery schedules as 
much as what would have been a smooth and efficient rate. Thus, action by 
Congress to keep lines open is included, low rate policies are included, 
etc. The results are then grouped into average rates per month as in 
Figure 7.
Some interesting features appear when production rates are arranged 
in this manner. The most obvious is that the predominant average rate of 
production has been and still is 10 to 20 aircraft per month. The extremely 
high rates of production of the F-86's and F-100's were possible because 
two separate production facilities were used simultaneously. Similarly the
F-84's were produced at two facilities. The F-102 is the only real example
-15-
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of higher than average rate at a single facility. It was also the product 
of the weapons system concept and Craig-Cook plan. There no doubt is 
some correlation, since the production line was set up and tested under 
this plan during full scale development. Overall, when all is said and 
done and the program is finished with production, the best guess is that 
the production will have averaged a rate of 10-20 aircraft per month.
The number of models or versions of each aircraft type as well as 
the number of types has decreased somewhat. In the early days of this 
period it was not uncommon to have four or more different models of each 
type. Often the early models were being phased out of the inventory 
while the later models were still being produced. With this rapid turn­
over of models came the inherent logistical problems. For instance there 
were three distinct F-86 models; the D's, the H's and the rest. About 
all that was common in these was the type number. Nowadays, the trend 
is toward fewer types, and models of each type, e.g. , the A-7, F-16 and
A-10. However, for the F-15 we now have the second model, a new one is 
-16-
proposed for the A-10, and a new engine is proposed for the F-16. Further, 
the announced policy of advancing existing airframes'*-^ will introduce more 
new models. It can be said, though, that such introductions will probably 
not be as frequent as in the past.
In this same vein, that is, the variety and quantity of production on 
a model for model basis, the Air Force is buying about the same quantities 
as it has since the introduction of jets. Excluding the 84F, which had a 
short operational life, and the 86D, an interim interceptor, there is no 
significant trend in the quantities of individual models of aircraft deliv­
ered, as shown in Figure 8. There was a large variety of models and types 
being accepted in the 50's, with the Air Force taking delivery of 10 
different models of aircraft in 1952. Now the Air Force is down to three 
models, and it has been accepting about that number of models for the 
past 15 years.
With the average production rates relatively constant and the number 
of aircraft produced per model in the same range, the dominant factor 
affecting the number of aircraft accepted annually is the number of models 
and types. (See Figure 9) The number of models and types presently being 
accepted is one per basic mission area and it appears that this number 
will not be exceeded for some time to come.
The industrial effect of the change in the nature of production is to 
reduce the number of facilities required to support the Air Force's annual 
production requirements. Projections indicate this will remain the case 
for some time, barring some unforseen crisis or technological breakthrough 
which would make the current models and types obsolete.
17-
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IV. DEPLOYMENT
The deployment or operational time of aircraft systems must be consid­
ered when evaluating the life cycle of aircraft systems. In this study 
deployment is measured from the first delivery to an operational unit to 
the phase-out of active forces. Use of the systems by the Air National 
Guard has been noted and it is acknowledged that ANG deployment is increas­
ingly important. However, since this study spans the period of modernization 
of the Air National Guard with current systems, their deployment has not 
been considered.
For the active forces there has been a major shift in the trend of the 
deployment life of aircraft systems. The mean lifetime has gone from an 
average of ten years in the 1950's to almost 20 years average for the first 
generation supersonic aircraft. Two of those systems, the F-105 and F-106, 
are still on active duty in late 1978. Further, not only has there been a 
shift in the deployment times of the fighter aircraft systems, there also 
has been a major shift in the tactical mission. In 1964 when the Air Force 
Figure 10
TYPE
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had approximately 3500 fighter aircraft in the active inventory, that number 
included 40 squadrons or about 720 interceptors for strategic air defense. 
The remaining tactical fighter force was about 2800 aircraft. The tactical
19
fighter and attack forces for 1979 are about 2650 fighters. Thus the major 
reason for wild swings in the fighter inventory has been the emphasis/ 
deemphasis on strategic air defense. The tactical force remained fairly 
stable except for the Vietnam peak, and the current generation of aircraft 
will probably stay active about as long as its predecessors, or about 20 
years. There could be some technological breakthrough which would cut 
short these deployment times, but none appears near and no one is planning 
for one.
1964 1968 1972 1976 (Fiscal Year)
20
ACTIVE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
Figure 11
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V. COST TRENDS
21
In Dr. Perry's statement to Congress, he indicates that there has
been a nine percent rate of growth per year in the cost of new fighter air-
22 
craft weapons systems over the last 30 year period. Other studies have 
indicated a five percent rate of growth per year in the cost of weapon 
systems. The issue is not whether the growth is five percent or nine per­
cent; either figure will do as an estimate for the increased cost of becoming 
more technically sophisticated. It is more important for planning purposes 
to have some notion of the increased cost of becoming more technically 
sophisticated as applied to specific services and as applied to specific 
mission areas. Therefore cost trends have been examined for Air Force 
tactical jet aircraft overall, air superiority aircraft, close air support 
aircraft and all weather interdiction (Figures 12 through 15).
For simplicity a few models of some types were not included because 
they had such short lives that they were not relevant or they duplicated 
information displayed by other models. The year indicated is the median 
fiscal year of production. The effect of using almost all models and 
their respective fly-away costs is to show the divergence in the costs of 
aircraft, model for model, for the same type. For instance, the cost of 
an F-105B is over twice that of the F-105D. Also, when examining specific 
mission areas, aircraft which have models in different mission areas can be 
more readily included in the sample.
23
Fly-away cost has its shortcomings when used to measure the increased 
cost of technology. It is a readily available figure and acceptable in in­
dicating trends. However, its shortcomings should be kept in mind. In 
addition to improved tactical capability, increasing fly-away costs result 
as the aircraft is made more self-reliant, more reliable, and more 
-22-
maintainable. For example, there are increased costs in the fly-away cost 
of an F-15 which are not directly comparable with other aircraft systems. 
The F-15 has a self-start capability. In comparison with an F-4, a full 
stabilator can be changed in one-third the time. The maintenance man-hours-
24
per-flight-hour is one-third that of F-101. These features all increase 
the fly-away cost of the current generation aircraft and are thought of as 
an increased cost of technology, hence capability, when in fact they are a 
tradeoff in the life cycle costs of the system. However, even with these 
shortcomings of the fly-away cost figures, a study of them is revealing and 
indicative of what's going on in the cost growth picture.
50 
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From Figure 12 it can be seen that the current overall cost growth, in 
constant dollars, is somewhere in the five to ten percent range. It is impor­
tant to note, however, that the rate of growth of the fly-away costs is less 
when compared to the first few generations of jet aircraft. It is also 
significant for historical purposes to note that the "knee" in the curve 
occurred coincidentally with the McNamara administration and initially was 
largely due to adapting Navy aircraft to Air Force missions. Rigorous cost 
ceilings on the F-15, F-16 and A-10 have continued this favorable trend. How­
ever this cumulative view obscures the cost growth of technology of separate 
mission areas.
In the air superiority mission area as defined as both all-weather and 
beyond visual range, the cost growth of technology on the whole is something 
less than that of the cumulative picture (Figure 13). However, there is a 
significant difference in the growth in the high and low of the high-low mix, 
with the low growing more rapidly. What such growth probably indicates is 
that more and more technology is being incorporated in the low technology 
solutions, such that the differential in capability between the high and low 
is becoming less. The high technology solutions should be relatively stable 
with small increments of cost growth, because the present state of the art has 
technical solutions for nearly the entire mission area. Further, agility and 
technical capability is being transferred from the aircraft to the missile 
systems. Therefore, the air superiority mission area should show a relatively 
small cost growth and be predictable and controllable.
In the close air support/attack mission area, the rate of cost growth 
of technology has been diminishing, also, with little differential between the 
high and the low of the high-low mix (Figure 14). This indicates a fairly 
close control of the technology and the capabilities of the aircraft systems. 
Although the early systems, the F-80, F-84, and F-100 were not specifically
-24-
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designed for the close air support role, they were used in that role predom­
inantly, so those systems are included to give some indication of the trends 
in technical cost growth. However, it can be seen that as an increasingly 
sophisticated all-weather capability is incorporated into aircraft of the 
close air support mission area, the growth rate of the cost of technology 
will increase rapidly.
50 FIGURE 14
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The all-weather interdiction area has the highest rate of growth in 
the cost of technology. There is a growth rate something on the order 
of 20 percent per year. This may seem astronomical; however, it is 
consistent with estimates for reconnaissance-strike all-weather aircraft. 
The technological sophistication required for this mission area, plus the 
technical capabilities yet to be resolved, would indicate that the cost 
growth of technology will continue to increase at a rapid rate. Further, 
the cost growth of so-called austere systems is as much or more than all 
-27-
other mission areas. Therefore, it is in this area that the Air Force 
could easily price itself right out of the market if it doesn't carefully 
screen the requirements and the technological alternatives. If growth 
trends in this mission area cannot be slowed in follow-on systems, then 
alternative solutions and innovative approaches to the deep interdiction 
mission must be investigated. This area seems to be ripe for a repeat 
of the B-l experience.
As can be seen from this discussion, the growth trends in the costs 
of aircraft are more significant in some mission areas than others. Careful 
management of the requirements and capabilities will affect the future growth 
trends. Tradeoffs of essential capabilities will have to be made in order 
for aircraft weapons systems to remain affordable, and those capabilities 
which are not included in aircraft systems must be resolved by alternative 
and hopefully less expensive weapons systems.
-28-
IV. CONCLUSIONS
There are several conclusions to be drawn from this study. However, 
the major one is that one should be very careful when speaking in absolutes 
and even cautious when speaking relatively. "Things are worse." Worse 
than when? There has been a shift in the nature of fighter aircraft 
development and life cycles. Understanding the changes and the circum­
stances surrounding those changes is essential to making assertions 
about the future trends based upon historical trends.
The development cycle is getting longer. At least, the time period 
called full scale development is growing. To say anything more would 
simply be the result of a bookkeeping exercise. It is not clear that 
there is a cause and effect, but longer development cycles seem to be 
associated with systems which have a longer deployment life. Recent 
systems are not as rapidly overwhelmed by technological innovation as 
in earlier years. As a matter of fact, the new systems seem better able 
to absorb new technology than the old systems.
Average production rates have not changed significantly. There have 
been production lines with spurts of high rate production, which everyone 
remembers. However, those spurts are offset by low rates such that the 
average rate of production then and now is roughly the same.
Cost trends are significant. Even more significant, the variance in 
trends depends upon the mission area. As the search for technical solutions 
proceeds, the costs of some mission areas can become prohibitive. In those 
mission areas, careful screening of the requirements is a must, and those 
capabilities deleted must be incorporated in other weapons systems or fore­
gone completely.
By reviewing the trends in U.S. Air Force tactical fighter life cycles, 
planners, program managers and analysts can evaluate future weapons systems 
-29-
proposals. Such a review highlights those areas of great sensitivity as 
well as those myths which have been perpetuated. The more disciplined 
and rigorous analysts may wish to contribute to this study area by further 
in-depth examination. Others may wish to group the data herein to arrive 
at another set of conclusions. Such efforts are encouraged with the view 
that such trend information is helpful in identifying what the Air Force 
can realistically expect to achieve with its fighter forces of the future.
-30-
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APPENDIX II - Flyaway Costs in Constant Dollars
Aircraft Fly Away Costs
Type/Model
Median 
Year
Then Year
$ (000) Indices
'79 Constant 
S Price
F-80
B 1948 95 32.9 288
C 1950 93 33.5 278
F-84
B 1948 164 32.9 498
C 1949 148 35.2 420
D 1949 212 35.2 602
E 1951 212 36.4 582
G 1952 237 36.2 654
F 1955 769 37.0 2,078
F-86
A 1950 178 36.4 487
E 1951 219 26.2 605
F 1953 211 35.4 596
H 1955 582 37.0 1,573
D 1954 344 35.5 969
F-89
B 1952 1,085 36.2 2,997
c 1952 797 36.2 2,202
D • 1955 801 37.0 2,164
H 1956 1,000 38.6 2,591
F-94
A 1951 258 36.4 708
3 1952 176 36.2 541
C 1953 534 35.4 1,508
F-100
A 1955 1,015 37.0 2,743
C 1956 663 38.6 1,718
D 1957 697 40.7 1,712
F 1958 804 41.0 1,961
F-101
A 1958 2,906 41.0 7,087
■B 1960 1,754 41.3 4,196
C 1958 1,276 41.0 3,112
F-102 1958 1,200 41.0 2,92"
F-104
A 1958 1,700 41.0 4,146
C 1959 1,500 41.3 3,632
F-105
B 1959 5,649 41.3 13,673
D 1963 2,400 42.3 5,607
F 1964 2,200 43.9 5,011
F-106 1960 4,700 41.8 11,244
F-4
C 1965 1,900 44.6 4,260
D 1967 l>700 47.7 3,564
E 1970 2,400 53.6 4,478
F-lll
A 1969 8,200 51.3 15,984
D 1972 8,500 58.7 14,430
E 1971 9,200 56.3 16,341
F 1973 10,300 61.2 16,330
A-7D 1971 3,800 56. 3 6,750
A-10 1980 5,700 94.2 6,051
F-15 1980 15,200 - 15,200
F-16 1980 10,140 - 10,140
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APPENDIX III - Trends in Flyaway Costs
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Guernica (1937) by Pablo Picasso 
Extended Loan from the artist to The Museum of Modern Art, New York City, N. Y.
